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Abstract
The eects on ex ante optima of a lag in seeing monetary realizations are studied using a
matching model of money. The main new ingredient in the model is meetings in which producers
have more information than consumers. A consequence is that increases in the amount of money
that occur with small enough probability can have negative impact eects on output, because
it is optimal to shut down trade in such low probability meetings rather than have lower output
when high probability realizations occur. The information lag also produces prices that do not
respond much to current monetary realizations.
JEL classication #'s: E30, E40, D82.
1. Introduction
We study the role of lags in seeing monetary realizations in a matching model. We do this by xing
the lag and varying the fraction of the population who know about the current realization without a
lag. The background environment is a familiar discrete-time, random-matching model with divisible
and perishable produced goods, indivisible money, and a unit upper bound on individual money
holdings. The aggregate amount of money follows a nite-state, rst-order Markov process. At
each date, the population is divided in a random way into a group, called the informed, who see
current realizations when they occur, and a group, called the uninformed, who see them with a
one-period lag. In this setting, we study how ex ante optima depend on the persistence of the
monetary uncertainty and on the size of the informed group. In particular, we describe how the
optimal responses of total output and the price level to monetary realizations vary with those
features of the environment. In studying an ex ante optimum, we are studying the output and
price level responses to monetary realizations for a society that cannot control its money supply
process or the asymmetric information about it. The society optimizes by choosing the way trade
will be conducted in meetings subject to individual rationality and truth-telling constraints.
Our model has three attractive features. One is its similarity to the world described by David
Hume in his attempt to describe and explain the eects on output and prices of money-supply
changes. He said,
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e-mail:<neilw@psu.edu>....Accordingly we nd, that, in every kingdom, into which money begins to ow in
greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face: labour and industry
gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising,... .
To account, then, for this phenomenon, we must consider, that though the high price
of commodities be a necessary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver, yet it
follows not immediately upon that encrease; but some time is required before the money
circulates through the whole state, and makes its eect be felt on all ranks of people.
At rst, no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price rises, rst of one commodity,
then of another; till the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of
specie which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this interval or intermediate
situation, between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the encreasing
quantity of gold and silver is favorable to industry. When any quantity of money is
imported into a nation, it is not at rst dispersed into many hands but is conned to
the coers of a few persons, who immediately seek to employ it to advantage. ...([5]
pages 37, 38)
There seem to be three explanatory ingredients in Hume's discussion: decentralized trade, asym-
metric information about the quantity of money, and an initial distribution of money that diers
from the steady-state distribution. Because our model contains versions of all three ingredients,
it provides a nice testing ground for Hume's notion that the existence of uninformed people is
important.
A second attractive feature of the model is that the existence of uninformed people is very
natural in the matching model context. In fact, a necessary condition for money to be essential
is that people not know what is happening in all other meetings; if they did, then they would
know their current trading partner's history and that, in turn, would eliminate an essential role for
money (see the discussions in Kocherlakota [9] and Wallace [16]). Not knowing what is happening
in all other meetings leads directly to the existence of uninformed people.
A third attractive feature, and, perhaps, the most important for the substantive results, is that
our specication breaks the tight link between who knows and who produces that appears in most
information-based models of output responses to money supply changes. In most such models, the
producers are uninformed and the consumers are informed (see Lucas [10], Eden [4], Lucas and
Woodford [11] and Wallace [15]). Barro and King [1] argue that that information pattern tends to
bias outcomes in favor of expansionary eects of money-supply increases and contractionary eects
for decreases. In our setting, the informed are a random subset of the population, some of whom
end up as producers and some as consumers.
In having some meetings with relatively informed consumers and other meetings with relatively
informed producers, our model resembles that of Jones and Manuelli [6]. There are, though, two
main dierences. One is that Jones and Manuelli impose a bargaining rule, while we study an ex
ante optimum.1 The other is that they take the terminal value of money to be exogenous, whereas
we determine it within the model. In that respect, their model is a variant of standard static
models of bilateral exchange with private information about valuations which are taken as xed.
The mechanism design problem in such settings is concerned with the extent to which trade can be
achieved when it is mutually benecial (see e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite [12] and Kennan and
Wilson [8]). In our model, on the other hand, the valuations depend on the mechanism, and most
of the analytical eort in the paper is devoted to the implications of that dependence.
The main limitation of the model is that an individual's money holding is a binary variable:
1One benet of describing an optimum is that it endogenizes how trade is conducted.
2money is not divisible, and individuals cannot store more than one unit. As a crude way to
control for the eects of this restriction, we interpret the eects of information lags relative to a
benchmark model which is identical except that everyone is informed about the current realization
when it occurs. However, because money is indivisible and because it enters and disappears in a
way which is a random version of lump-sum taxes and transfers, that benchmark does not display
neutrality.
The benchmark has the following features. The price level and total output at a date depend
only on the monetary realization for that date. The price level is increasing in the amount of
money, but total output can be increasing or decreasing in the amount of money. We assume that
the amount of money is never so large as to reduce the fraction of meetings in which trade occurs
(because such a crowding-out eect would arise only because of the restriction on money holdings).2
That implies that output is increasing in the amount of money at the extensive margin. However,
the amount produced in each meeting, which is governed mainly by the probability of subsequently
meeting people without money, is decreasing in the amount of money. Our characterization of
optimal trading arrangements does not depend on which of those eects dominates.
The introduction of an information lag produces relationships between money and total output
and the price level that are surprisingly complicated in view of the simplicity of the environment.
In particular, they make total output and the price level at a date depend on both the current and
previous period's realization of the money supply. Total output relative to the benchmark behaves
in a way that depends on what happens in meetings between the informed and the uninformed. The
larger the amount of money, the larger the fraction of meetings between informed consumers and
uninformed producers in which trade can occur. Moreover, because, as we show, there is trade in all
those meetings and a level of production in each meeting which for higher than average realizations
is higher than the level that would be produced if the producer were informed, such meetings tend
to be a source of positive impact eects relative to the benchmark. However, meetings between
informed producers and uninformed consumers provide a potential oset. If a high monetary
realization is suciently unlikely, then the optimum has no-trade in meetings between informed
producers and uninformed consumers when such a realization occurs. When that happens and
if there are enough such meetings, then there can be negative impact eects on output. If the
high monetary realization occurs with high enough probability, then the optimum does not have
no-trade and the oset does not occur.3 The optimum, by the way, does not have no-trade when
a low probability low monetary realization occurs. Hence, impact eects can be asymmetric.
The existence of uninformed people produces price level stickiness relative to our benchmark.
When two uninformed people meet, their actions cannot depend on the current realization. In
addition, the truth-telling constraints in meetings between the informed and the uninformed turn
out to be another source of price level stickiness.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the environment we study. In section
3, we describe the set of deterministic mechanisms we consider and the optimum problem. In
section 4, we present our main results, a characterization of the optimum in an interesting region
of the parameter space: the region in which producer participation constraints are binding, but
consumer participation constraints are not. In section 5, we present examples which display the
eects described above. In section 6, we discuss the role of randomization. In section 7, we point
out the dierences between the optimal mechanism and bargaining in which consumers, whether
informed or not, make take-it-or-leave-it oers. All the proofs appear in the Appendix.
2Aside from that restriction, we do not attempt to choose the exogenous money supply process optimally. In our
examples, however, the support of the Markov process for the money supply straddles the constant amount of money
that is optimal given the other parameters in the model.
3Results somewhat like these are obtained by Jones and Manuelli.
32. The environment
We rst set out the familiar background environment. Then we describe how money supply changes
come about.
2.1. The background environment
Aside from the uncertainty about the stock of money, the environment is that in Wallace [15], which,
in turn, is essentially that in Shi [13] and Trejos and Wright [14]. Time is discrete and the horizon
is innite. There are N distinct, divisible, and perishable types of goods at each date and there is a
[0;1] continuum of each of N specialization types of people, where N  3. A specialization type-n
person consumes only good n and produces only good n + 1 (modulo N), for n = 1;2;:::;N. Each
person maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor  2 (0;1). Utility in a period is
given by u(x)   y, where x is the amount consumed and y is the amount produced. The function
u is dened on [0;1) , is increasing, strictly concave, and satises u(0) = 0 and u0(0) = 1:
In each period, people are randomly matched in pairs. Meetings are of two sorts: single-
coincidence meetings, those between a type n person (the producer) and a type n + 1 person (the
consumer) for some n; and no-coincidence meetings, those in which neither person produces what
the other consumes. (Because the number of types, N, exceeds two, there are no double-coincidence
meetings.) We assume that people cannot commit to what they will do in future meetings.
Money consists of perfectly durable and indivisible objects which cannot be produced and which
do not yield utility directly. We assume that each person can carry from one date to the next at
most one unit of money. We also assume that each trader in a meeting is able to see the trading
partner's specialization type, money holdings, and whether the person is informed or not, but is
otherwise ignorant about the trading partner's history.
2.2. How changes in the amount of money come about
The quantity of money follows an S-state Markov process. That is, there are S potential levels for
the stock of money: m1;m2;:::;mS where mi 2 (0;1) and mi < mi+1: Here mi is the state i amount
of money per specialization type. We let ij denote the probability that the current state is j given
that the previous state is i and let  denote the associated transition matrix. We assume that
ij > 0 which implies that  has a unique invariant distribution which assigns positive probability
to each state.
We want changes in the money supply to come about in a way that gives no immediate in-
formation to the uninformed. That is accomplished by assuming that only informed people either
gain or lose money and by assuming the following timing. At the end of each date after meetings
have dissolved, the current amount of money is publicly announced. (Consequently, at that time,
people dier only in money holdings, not in information.) Then, a randomly chosen subset of each
specialization type, of measure ; is selected and is informed about the new state. If the previous
state is i; then the measure of newly informed with money is mi and the measure without money
is (1   mi). If the new state is j > i; then a randomly chosen subset of the informed without
money, a subset of measure mj   mi; is given a unit of money. If the new state is j < i; then a
randomly chosen subset of the informed with money, a subset of measure mi   mj; loses a unit of
money. Then meetings occur and the sequence is repeated.
In order to be able to have all changes in the amount of money be experienced by those who
are informed, we need to assume that  is large enough relative to the monetary changes. The








The following two-by-two table contains the fraction of each specialization type according to
whether they are informed and whether they have money given that the previous state is i and the
current state is j:
Table 1. Distribution when the previous state is i and the current state is j:
0 units of money 1 unit of money sums
informed (1   mi)   (mj   mj)  ji mi + mj   mi     ji 
uninformed (1   )(1   mi) (1   )mi 1   
sums 1   mj mj 1
Lemma 1 conrms that (2.1) is sucient to have all monetary changes impinge on the informed.
Lemma 1. If (2.1) holds, then ji and    ji are non-negative.
The description of the environment is now complete. As we will see, it turns out to be com-
plicated because there are meetings in which there is asymmetric information. Such situations are
unavoidable in the following sense. While it makes sense to study the extreme in which everyone
is informed ( = 1) and in which, therefore, there is no asymmetric information, it does not make
sense to study the other extreme in which no one is informed ( = 0): According to (2.1), if no
one is informed, then there cannot be monetary uncertainty. More generally, it is hard to think of
formulations in which everyone is both symmetrically informed and less than fully informed about
monetary realizations.
For any ; the monetary uncertainty has obvious incentive eects in our model. It makes those
without money, the potential producers, less willing to produce in order acquire money because
(i) they may lose the money acquired before they get to spend it; and (ii) if they do not produce,
then they may be given a unit. It also makes those with money, the potential consumers, more
willing to spend money because (i) if they do not spend it, then they may lose it; and (ii) if they do
spend it, then they may be given a unit. The magnitude of those eects depends on the monetary
uncertainty; roughly speaking, it is larger the larger is the range of monetary variation, mS   m1;
and the smaller is the persistence implied by :
3. Mechanisms and the optimum problem
In this section, we present our theory of what happens in the environment described above. We do
this in three steps. The rst step is to describe a set of Markov mechanisms. The only meetings
in which anything can happen are called trade meetings, meetings which are single-coincidence
meetings in which the potential consumer has a unit of money and the producer does not. What
happens is assumed to depend on the previous realization and on announcements about the current
realization. The second step is to describe the subset of mechanisms that we call incentive-feasible.
For us, a mechanism is incentive-feasible if it satises two conditions: it is consistent with truth-
telling and is consistent with ex post individual rationality in the sense that it gives expected
non-negative gains from trade to each person as they leave the meeting. (This last restriction
implies that production is zero except in trade meetings, which is why we can limit consideration
to trade meetings.) In particular, an uninformed person in a meeting has a chance to say no to a
5trade after seeing the proposed trade, but the proposed trade does not in general reveal the current
state to the uninformed person.4 The third step is our selection from the set of incentive-feasible
mechanisms. Our selection is an ex ante optimum, one which maximizes the ex ante expected
utility of a representative person.
3.1. Markov mechanisms
Let S  f0;1;2;:::;Sg be the set of individual information states. If s denotes a generic element
of S; then s = 0 means uninformed about the current state and s > 0 means informed and that
the current amount of money is ms: We also let S+  f1;2;:::;Sg: A Markov mechanism is a pair
of functions that describes output and the transfer of money in trade meetings. That is, we let
y(sc;sp;i): S  S  S+ ! R+ denote output in a trade meeting when the consumer announces
information state sc; the producer announces sp; and the previous money-supply realization is i:
We also let a(sc;sp;i): S  S  S+ ! f0;1g denote the money transfer (0 means no transfer, 1
means transfer) in such a meeting. We record this notion of a mechanism as a denition.
Denition 1. A mechanism is a pair (y;a) where y : SSS+ ! R+ and a : SSS+ ! f0;1g:
Notice that we are not permitting randomization. We discuss the potential role of randomization
after we present our results for deterministic mechanisms.
3.2. Incentive-feasible mechanisms
One way to describe the class of mechanisms we study is as follows. At each meeting, there is
a computer that is programmed at date 0 before people go o to their meetings, but is able to
receive messages. At the beginning of a date, when the previous state is publicly announced, that
information is received by each computer. In addition, the computer at a meeting is able to see
who is informed and who is a producer and who is a consumer. If both are informed, then both
simultaneously announce to the computer an element of S+. If one person is informed, then that
person announces to the computer an element of S+. The uninformed person in the meeting does
not see the announcement. In all cases, the computer then proposes a trade, which may be no
trade. Then each person's choice is either to accept or reject, where rejection by either person
implies no trade. Acceptance by both implies that the proposed trade is carried out. Whether
trade occurs or not, the meeting ends. A mechanism is incentive feasible if it induces truth-telling
and if the proposed trade satises individual rationality, and, therefore, induces acceptance.
Before we present the details, we can give an overview of the results. First, because we require
non-negative expected gains from trade as people leave a meeting, there are never pure transfers
between people. That is, we do not permit people to commit beforehand to the realization from a
distribution; they have to be willing to carry out each realization. Therefore, production occurs if
and only if money changes hands. And because the amount of money that changes hands is always
one unit, in meetings between the informed and the uninformed the amount produced in exchange
for money cannot depend on the current state. (If it did, then it would not be consistent with truth-
telling by the informed person.) Therefore, in meetings between asymmetrically informed people,
4Note that the ex post stage here is taken to be the situation at the end of a meeting, rather than the subse-
quent stage at which the current money supply is publicly announced (which is the point at which ex post welfare
comparisons would conventionally be made). If it is assumed that all information available to the participants in
each meeting is revealed in that meeting, then there are additional restrictions on the set of mechanisms. We are
indebted to Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Narayana Kocherlakota for conversations that helped steer us away from such a
more restrictive specication.
6the mechanism has only to describe the amount produced and a partition of the set of current states
into trade and no-trade sets. Moreover, those sets have to be ordered: if the producer is informed,
then the set of states in which trade occurs has to be composed of those in which acquiring a unit
of money is most valuable; if the consumer is informed, then it has to be composed of those in
which acquiring a unit of money is least valuable.
If there were no incentive constraints, then maximization of ex ante welfare would dictate that
production occur in every trade meeting and at a level at which the marginal utility of consuming
equals the marginal disutility of producing|namely, at the solution to u0(y) = 1; which we denote
y: For some regions of the parameter space ( near enough to unity and  with sucient persis-
tence), an outcome with y produced in every trade meeting is incentive-feasible. We view that to
be an uninteresting outcome|in part because the price level would then be constant at 1
y, not
dependent on the monetary realization. Therefore, we focus on a region of the parameter space
where output as high as y is not incentive-feasible because it fails to satisfy producer individual-
rationality constraints. As we show below, that is easily accomplished|for example, by assuming
that  is suciently far from unity.5
With output below y, ex-ante welfare is increasing in output in every kind of meeting. There-
fore, if producer individual-rationality constraints were the only constraints, then an optimum
would satisfy those constraints with equality (that is, all of the gains from trade would accrue
to the consumer). However, there are also consumer individual-rationality and truth-telling con-
straints. If the consumer and the producer have the same information about the future value of
money, then when the level of output is such that the disutility of producing is just equal to the
value of money, the utility of consuming this output must exceed the value of money. That is, if the
producer's individual-rationality constraint binds in this situation, then the consumer's individual-
rationality constraint is slack. We build on this result and, in eect, assume that the range of the
support for the money supply, mS   m1; is small enough to make consumer individual-rationality
constraints non-binding even in meetings with asymmetric information. In other words we assume
that the informational discrepancies are never large enough to outweigh the surplus generated when
the producer supplies enough output to make the producer's individual-rationality constraint bind.
Under those assumptions, we show that it is optimal to have trade occur in every trade meeting
except possibly in some of the meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers.
Moreover, in all meetings, there are binding producer individual-rationality constraints. This is
the partial characterization of the optimum that we give in section 4. It is partial because it holds
only in a region of the parameter space and because it does not pin down the cut-o between trade
and no-trade states in meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers. Despite
that, the characterization makes it very simple to nd solutions for examples. It also allows us to
prove that if  displays sucient persistence, then it is optimal to shut down trade in meetings
between informed producers and uninformed consumers whenever an increase in the amount of
money occurs.
We now turn to details. In order to express the constraints on mechanisms implied by our
specication of incentive-feasibility, it is helpful to have a notation for expected discounted utilities.
We let Vk(i) denote the expected utilities of someone who has k units money just after the previous
state i is announced (and before the determination of the new state and the new set of informed
people). We let Vk denote the S -element vector with generic component Vk(i): We also let i 
V1(i)   V0(i) and   V1   V0.
5The possibility that output is constant at y
 whenever trade occurs is an artifact of the unit upper bound on
holdings. Output cannot be constant whenever trade occurs if individual money holdings are not restricted to the
set f0;1gand if individual discounted expected utility is strictly increasing in money holdings.
7It is also helpful to let Gk(c;p;s;i) be the gain, relative to not trading, in a trade meeting of
someone with k units of money when the current realization is s and the previous realization is i,
and when both parties announce truthfully. Here, c 2 f0;1g indicates whether the consumer is
informed (c = 1) or uninformed (c = 0), and p 2 f0;1g indicates, in the same way, whether the
producer is informed. Then,
G0(c;p;s;i) =  y(cs;ps;i) + a(cs;ps;i)s
G1(c;p;s;i) = u(y(cs;ps;i))   a(cs;ps;i)s: (3.1)
Notice that
G0(c;p;s;i) + G1(c;p;s;i) = z(y(cs;ps;i)) (3.2)
where z(y)  u(y)   y:
We can use these gain denitions to connect the discounted utilities to the mechanism. It is
convenient to do this in two steps. We let vk(;s;i) : f0;1g  S+  S+ ! R+ denote the expected
discounted utility of someone who (i) holds k 2 f0;1g units of money, and (ii) is either informed
( = 1) or uninformed ( = 0) when the current state is s and the previous state is i|all of this
prior to meetings but after determination of the set of newly informed people and after additions
or subtractions of money: These continuation values satisfy
Nv0(;j;i) = NV0(j) + (   ji)G0(1;;j;i) + (1   )miG0(0;;j;i)
Nv1(;j;i) = NV1(j) + jiG1(;1;j;i) + (1   )(1   mi)G1(;0;j;i):
(3.3)




ij[(1   )v0(0;j;i) + v0(1;j;i)] +
S X
j=i




ij[(1   )v1(0;j;i) + v1(1;j;i)]  
i 1 X
j=1





mi if j < i
1  
1 mj
1 mi if j  i
: (3.5)
It follows from (2.1) that ij  :
8Notice that equations (3.4) with the vk(;s;i) replaced by their expressions in (3.3) consist
of 2S equations in V0 and V1 that are linear for a given (y;a): Moreover, with that substitution
into equations (3.4), for a given (y;a) the right-hand sides of equations (3.4) can be viewed as a
function that maps R2S to R2S: It is immediate that that mapping satises Blackwell's sucient
conditions for contraction: monotonicity and discounting. Therefore, equations (3.1)-(3.5) have a
unique solution for V0 and V1 for a given (y;a):
We next express the truth-telling and individual rationality constraints. For trade meetings
with symmetric information, the individual-rationality constraints are as follows. For producers,
they are
G0(1;1;s;i)  0 and
S X
j=1
ijG0(0;0;j;i)  0: (3.6)
For consumers, they are
G1(1;1;s;i)  0 and
S X
j=1
ijG1(0;0;j;i)  0: (3.7)
In each case, the rst inequality pertains to an informed person who meets an informed person,
while the second pertains to an uninformed person who meets an uninformed person. (Of course,
for meetings between uninformed people, the condition is that there be expected gains from trade
because the trade occurs before the participants know the current state.) When both are informed,
truth-telling is always a Nash strategy (provided the mechanism proposes no-trade when it receives
mutually inconsistent reports). Hence, truth-telling in symmetrically informed meetings does not
imply additional constraints.
We next consider trade meetings between the informed and the uninformed. If the informed is
the producer, then the truth-telling constraint is
a(0;s;i)s   y(0;s;i)  a(0;s0;i)s   y(0;s0;i); (3.8)
while if the informed is the consumer, then the truth-telling constraint is
u(y(s;0;i))   a(s;0;i)s  u(y(s0;0;i))   a(s0;0;i)s: (3.9)
Both must hold for all (s;s0) 2 S+  S+:
Therefore, as noted above, if a(0;s;i) = a(0;s0;i); then the producer's truth-telling constraint
implies y(0;s;i) = y(0;s0;i); while if a(s;0;i) = a(s0;0;i); then the consumer's truth-telling con-
straint implies y(s;0;i) = y(s0;0;i): Moreover, the individual-rationality constraints imply that
there is positive production if and only if the consumer surrenders his or her unit of money. There-
fore, we let
Sp(i) = fj 2 S+ : a(0;j;i) = 1g and Sc(i) = fj 2 S+ : a(j;0;i) = 1g; (3.10)
and let y(0;j;i) = Y p(i) for j 2 Sp(i) and y(j;0;i) = Y c(i) for j 2 Sc(i). Then the truth-telling
constraints are equivalent to
max
j2S+ Sp(i)






fjg  u(Y c(i))  min
j2S+ Sc(i)
fjg; (3.12)
9where we interpret the rst to be vacuous if Sp(i) or S+   Sp(i) is empty and the second to be
vacuous if Sc(i) or S+   Sc(i) is empty. These are the truth-telling constraints with regard to
the partition of current states between the no-trade states and the trade states. They describe
precisely the sense in which the gain from acquiring money has to be ordered across trade and
no-trade states.
Finally, we have individual-rationality constraints for participants in these meetings. For an
informed producer, the individual-rationality constraint is the second inequality in (3.11), while for














Here, ij(   ji)=1
i is the probability that the current state is j given that j 2 Sc(i), that
the previous state is i; and that the trading partner is an informed person with money. For an
informed consumer, the individual-rationality constraint is the rst inequality in (3.12), while for














i is the probability that the current state is j given that j 2 Sp(i); that the previous
state is i; and that the trading partner is an informed person without money. That is, the unin-
formed person in these meetings is calculating an expected gain from trade given the information
implied by truth-telling, which reveals the set of trade states, and the knowledge about the current
state implied by observing the money holding of someone who could have gained or lost money.
We can now record the denition of an incentive-feasible mechanism.
Denition 2. A mechanism (y;a) is incentive feasible if there exist Vk(i) that satisfy (3.1)-(3.14).
An immediate implication is that if (y;a) is incentive feasible (in particular, satises the
individual-rationality constraints), then V0(i) and V1(i) are non-negative.
3.3. The optimum problem
We now describe our selection from the above set of incentive-feasible mechanisms. Our selection




ps[msV1(s) + (1   ms)V0(s)]: (3.15)
Here pi denotes the invariant probability, implied by the ij; that the amount of money is mi: This
objective corresponds to starting up the economy by drawing the previous state from that invariant
10distribution and considering expected utility prior to such a draw and to initial assignments of
money holdings.
The following lemma expresses Z in terms of the parameters of the environment and the output
levels in an arbitrary mechanism.

































is(   si)z[y(s;0;i)]: (3.16)
Notice that output levels, the components of y; appear in Z only by way of the function z
(z(x)  u(x)   x) and that a, the money transfer variable, does not appear. Because z(y); where
u0(y) = 1; is an upper bound on z((y(s;s0;i)) and because the weight on z((y(s;s0;i)) in (3.16) is
non-negative, an upper bound on Z is obtained by having y produced and consumed in all trade
meetings. Because one-quarter of all single-coincidence meetings, the maximum of the function
m(1   m) for m 2 [0:1]; is an upper bound on the number of trade meetings, it follows that an
upper bound on Z is
z(y)
4N(1 )  Z:
That bound on Z implies a bound on the set of incentive-feasible outputs. Let q = mins(psms):
By (3.15), if (y;a) is incentive-feasible, then, by the non-negativity of the Vk(s); V1(s)  Z=q
and s  Z=q. By the individual-rationality constraints, it follows that each component of an
incentive-feasible y is bounded above by Z=q: Moreover, because the Vk(s) and, therefore, s are
continuous in y; and because the constraints are expressed as weak inequalities, it follows that the
optimum problem amounts to maximizing a continuous function over a non empty compact set.6
Therefore, a maximum exists.
4. A Partial Characterization of the Optimum
As noted above, we concentrate our study of optima in a region of the parameter space that is both
interesting and tractable. To be interesting, the optimum should not be the unconstrained welfare
maximum, y(s;s0;i)  y: Below (see lemma 5) we show that a simple sucient condition implies
that if y is incentive feasible; then y(s;s0;i)  y.
To state the condition, let yi





6Non emptiness is implied by the fact that no trade satises all the constraints. As will become evident later, the
Theorem of the Maximum does not apply because the constraint set is not lower hemicontinuous.
11If the distribution of money is degenerate at mi; then yi
max is the largest constant output that
satises the producer's individual-rationality constraint (see [3], page 110). It follows from u0(0) =
1 that yi
max > 0: Moreover, yi
max is decreasing in mi: We assume that
y  y1
max: (4.2)
Because y depends only on the function z and because y1
max ! 0 as  ! 0 or N ! 1; (4.2),
which we maintain from now on, can always be satised: Under assumption (4.2), we are assured
that the objective Z is increasing in each component of an incentive-feasible y, a fact which plays
a role in our characterization.
In addition to keeping outputs below y|in fact, as we show, below y1
max|we characterize
the solution to the above optimum problem under one other assumption, which for now we leave
implicit: we assume that any optimum satises u( mins s)  y1
max: Because, as we show below,
(4.2) and incentive feasibility imply  maxs s  y1
max; this assumption implies that u( mins s) 
 maxs s. That, in turn, implies that consumer individual-rationality constraints are not binding
at an optimum. Later, we present a sucient condition for satisfaction of u( mins s)  y1
max;
one which holds for our examples.
4.1. The value of acquiring money
We begin by deriving some facts about   V1   V0. We know that there is a unique  for
each mechanism. We denote it (y;a): The rst result is about the weighted average of  that
appears in the individual rationality constraint for uninformed producers in meetings with informed
consumers, (3.13). It is part of the argument for the result that the optimum satises Sc(i)  S+:












ij(   ji)j: (4.3)
The proof makes use of truth-telling for informed consumers, the implied ordering of  between
Sc(i) and S+   Sc(i).
The next lemma describes some properties of a mapping whose xed point is (y;a): The
mapping eliminates, through substitution, the continuation values that were introduced as part of
connecting the Vk(i) to the allocation (y;a): Let
h(x;y;a)  b(y) + C(a)x for x 2 RS: (4.4)
where the S  S matrix C(a)  [cij(a)] and the S  1 vector b(y)  [bi(y)] are dened as
cij(a)
ij
















[(1   mi)a(j;0;i) + mia(0;j;i)]g (4.5)
and




ij [jiu(y(0;j;i)) + (   ji)y(j;0;i)] +
12S X
j=1




ij(   ij)[(1   mi)u(y(j;0;i)) + miy(0;j;i)]: (4.6)
Lemma 4. Let h(x;y;a) be given by (4.4)-(4.6). Then (i) (y;a) is a xed point of h(;y;a); (ii)
h(;y;a) satises Blackwell's sucient conditions for contraction; (iii) if h((y;a);y0;a0)  (y;a);
then (y0;a0)  (y;a); and (iv) if y0  y; then (y0;a)  (y;a):
The next lemma, which uses assumption (4.2), shows that satisfaction of producer individual-
rationality constraints implies that y1
max is an upper bound on i(y;a) and on output.
Lemma 5. If (y;a) satises producer individual-rationality constraints and has constant output
over trade states in meetings between informed and uninformed; then y(s;s0;i)   maxi i(y;a) 
y1
max:
We are now ready for the characterization.
4.2. The characterization
Proposition 1 gives the necessary conditions for an optimum that we mentioned above.
Proposition 1. If (y;a) is optimal and satises u( mins s(y;a))  y1







ij(   ji)j(y;a) for all i 2 S+; (4.7)
a(0;0;i) = 1 and y(0;0;i) =
S X
j=1
ijj(y;a) for all i 2 S+; (4.8)
a(j;j;i) = 1 and y(j;j;i) = j(y;a) for all (i;j) 2 S+  S+; (4.9)
and
Y p(i) = min
j2Sp(i)
fj(y;a)g for all i 2 S+; (4.10)
(ii) for each i; Sp(i) is not empty; and (iii) if j(y;a) = k(y;a); then for each i either j;k 2 Sp(i)
or j;k 2 S+   Sp(i):
The rather lengthy proof proceeds by contradiction. We rst suppose that (y;a) is optimal,
but does not satisfy (i). Then we consider (y0;a0) given by (4.7)-(4.10), but with (y;a) inserted
on the right-hand sides of (4.7)-(4.10). Then incentive-feasibility of y implies that y0  y: The
main part of the proof involves showing that hi((y;a);y0;a0)  i(y;a) = hi((y;a);y;a); where
hi is the i-th component of the mapping dened in (4.4). Given that inequality, the third part of
lemma 4 implies that (y0;a0)  (y;a): It follows that (y0;a0) satises all the producer individual-
rationality constraints. Moreover, by lemma 5, j(y0;a0)  y1
max: Therefore, u( mins s(y0;a0))
 u( mins s(y;a))  y1
max   maxs s(y0;a0): It follows that (y0;a0) satises all the consumer
individual-rationality constraints. It also satises truth-telling for the informed consumer because
it has trade in every state when the consumer is informed. But (y0;a0) may or may not satisfy
truth-telling for informed producers. If it does, then we have a contradiction because y1
max  y0  y
13and we have either increased output or replaced no-trade by trade, both of which increase Z: If
not, then there is some previous state i and some current state r such that r(y0;a0) > Y p(i)0
 r(y;a): We then consider (y0;a00); where a00 diers from a0 only in adding state r to Sp(i):
We can show that (y0;a00)  (y;a): Repetition of this argument at most S times leads to trade
in every state, which renders truth-telling vacuous. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved using simple
versions of the same argument.
The next lemma shows that for a given specication of the Sp(i) sets there is a unique monetary
mechanism (i.e., a mechanism with positive trade) that satises condition (i) of proposition 1.
Lemma 6. Given Sp(i) for each i 2 S+; there exists a unique monetary mechanism that satises
(4.7)-(4.10).
The proof shows that a mapping whose xed points coincide with solutions to (4.7)-(4.10) and
 = h(;y;a) has a unique positive xed point. The proof relies on monotonicity and concavity
of the mapping (see [7]). One by-product of the proof is the result that the solution to (4.7)-(4.10)
and  = h(;y;a) can be obtained by a simple iterative scheme that does not require solving
simultaneous equations.
Proposition 1 and lemma 6 give us a simple procedure for nding the optimum for a given
environment (that satises the hypotheses of proposition 1). For each specication of the Sp(i)
sets, obtain the unique monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10). Discard those that are
inconsistent with truth-telling for the informed producer. Among those that remain, the optimum
is the one that gives the highest Z: Because Sp(i)  S+ satises truth-telling, there is at least one
monetary mechanism that is incentive-feasible.
We now show that the maximized objective is continuous in  provided that ii is bounded
away from 0 for each i. We establish such continuity in two steps. First, we show that for given
Sp(i) sets, the unique monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) is continuous in .
Lemma 7. Let Sp(i) for i 2 S+ be given. Let P = f : ii   > 0 for all ig: Then the unique
monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) is continuous in  for  2 P.
Now we give the main continuity result.
Proposition 2. If the optimum satises u( mins s)  y1
max; then the maximized objective is
continuous in  for  such that ij is positive and ii is bounded away from 0.
While the proof uses lemma 7, it must do more than appeal to the fact that the maximum of
continuous functions is continuous. The unique monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) for
given Sp(i) sets may satisfy truth-telling for informed producers for some 0s and not others. We
can show that if 0 is a critical point in terms of such truth-telling (truth-telling holds at 0 but
not in the neighborhood of 0), then necessary condition (iii) in proposition 1 fails at 0. That, in
turn, implies that the maximum cannot be at such a critical point. That and lemma 7 imply that
the maximized objective is continuous.
There is a sense in which optima are not very interesting if they always satisfy Sp(i)  S+:
To see why that does not always happen, we begin with an informal argument for a simple case.
Consider S = 2 and a symmetric transition matrix,
 =

1   " "
" 1   "

: (4.11)
14When " = 0; the model is one with a constant money supply. Then the optimum is y(ci;pi;i) =
yi
max (see (4.1)). Now suppose that " > 0; but small. In this model, the current amount of money
inuences the producer's individual-rationality constraint because it inuences the distribution
of the amount of money next period. Thus, if " is near 0, then we expect that the producer's
individual-rationality constraint is slacker the smaller is the current money supply. Now consider
meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers. If last period's state is m1 and
if production is positive in both current states, then output has to be independent of the current
state and, therefore, low enough to satisfy the producers individual rationality constraint when the
current state is m2. If, instead, there is no-trade when the current state is m2; then output can be
higher when the current state is m1: If " is suciently close to 0; then it should be optimal to have
no-trade when the current state is m2. Matters are dierent if last period's state is m2: Then in
order to get higher output in some state than output that is constant across current states, there
would have to be no-trade when the current state is m2: But that would not be benecial because
the conditional probability of m2 is high.
We formalize that discussion as follows.
Proposition 3. Let fkg ! I (the identity matrix) and be such that the corresponding sequence
of stationary probability vectors fpkg converges to a strictly positive vector. Assume that the
optimum for any  in the neighborhood of  = I satises u( mins s)  y1
max: There exists
K such that if k > K; then the optimum for k has no-trade between informed producers and
uninformed consumers whenever the current state, j; exceeds the previous state, i.
The main idea for the proof is similar to the discussion given above for S = 2:
Now that we have characterized the optimum, a comment about implementing it is in order.
The optimum we have described is easy to implement, and without using the ction of a computer
at each meeting that receives reports and is updated when the previous state is publicly announced.
At each trade meeting and conditional on the knowledge that is common to the two people in the
meeting, the optimum has a single positive trade proposal. Indeed, this is a feature of any incentive-
feasible mechanism. Therefore, we can let the two people play a simultaneous move game in which
the strategies are simply ftrade, no-tradeg. If both say trade, then the positive trade proposal is
carried out. If either says no-trade, then there is no trade and each goes on to the next date. In
part because the optimum has positive trade in every state when the consumer is informed and the
producer is not, it is a dominant strategy for the consumer in every trade meeting to play trade.
Given that play by the consumer, it is a best response for the producer to play the strategy that
implements the optimum.
4.3. Sucient conditions for u( mins s)  y1
max
Our last task in this section is to provide a sucient condition for assuring that any optimum
satises u( mins s)  y1
max; the hypothesis of propositions 1-3. The sucient condition uses a
lower bound on the optimal magnitude of Z; a bound we call Zmin: As part of the proof that shows
that a small enough range for the support of the money supply is sucient to insure u( mins s) 
y1
max (lemma 9); we provide one such Zmin: More generally, Zmin could be obtained from any lemma
6 mechanism that is incentive feasible.
We begin by constructing an upper bound on ex ante utility implied by any allocation that
violates u( mins s)  y1
max: The idea is that violating this inequality implies that at least one
component of  is less than u 1(y1
max) and that this implies upper bounds on outputs and, hence
on ex ante utility. For each k 2 S+; let k 2 RS be dened by k
j = y1
max= for j 6= k and
k
k = u 1(y1









yk(j;j;i) = yk(0;j;i) = k





for all i;j 2 S+:
Lemma 8. Let Z(yk) be ex ante welfare implied by yk as given by (4.12). Let Zmin be the ex ante
welfare implied by some incentive-feasible mechanism. If there exists Zmin such that Z(yk)  Zmin
for each k 2 S+; then any optimum satises u( mins s)  y1
max:
The proof in outline is as follows. If the optimum violates u( mins s)  y1
max; then yk is
strictly greater than any optimal y, and, hence, Z(yk) is strictly greater than the optimum Z .
Therefore, if Z(yk)  Zmin for each k 2 S+; then we have a contradiction and the optimum cannot
satisfy u( mins s) < y1
max:
Lemma 8 is a crude result because the specication in (4.12) is a crude upper bound on an
incentive feasible y given that k < u 1(y1
max) for some k: Despite that crudeness, the next result
says that the hypothesis of lemma 8 can always be met if the range of the support for the money
supply is suciently small.
Lemma 9. There exists " > 0 such that if mS   m1 < "; then the hypothesis of lemma 8 holds:
In the proof of this lemma, we construct a Zmin from a mechanism with constant output and
trade in every trade meeting. Then we show that as mS m1 ! 0; this constant output approaches
y1
max: That, in turn, guarantees that the implied Zmin satises the hypothesis of lemma 8.
To summarize, the following two-step algorithm permits us to determine whether a given envi-
ronment satises conditions that are sucient to insure that any optimum satises y1
max  y and
u( mini)  y1
max:
(i). Compute y1
max and y and check whether y1
max  y: (Then lemma 5 implies that any
optimum satises y1
max   maxi:)
(ii). Attempt to nd some Zmin (the optimum from lemma 6 and the construction in the proof
of lemma 9 are possibilities) for which the hypothesis of lemma 8 holds.
5. Examples
We present three examples designed mainly to emphasize the consequences for aggregates of whether
trade is shut down in some meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers. As
discussed in the introduction, we expect any such shutting down to aect the magnitude of the total
output response to changes in the amount of money relative to what happens in the benchmark
case of everyone informed ( = 1):
The aggregates we study are total output and the price level. For each example, we present
the optimal Markov process for each. Let Yij and Pij denote total output and the price level,
respectively, when the previous state is i and the current state is j: For a given mechanism, total
output is the appropriate sum of outputs over meetings:
NYij = mi(1   mi)(1   )2y(0;0;i) + (   ji)jiy(j;j;i) +
(   ji)(1   mi)(1   )y(j;0;i) + miji(1   )y(0;j;i): (5.1)
16We take Pij to be total nominal output, denoted Xij; divided by Yij; the usual denition of the
total output deator.7 Because one unit of money is traded in every meeting in which trade occurs,
for a given mechanism total nominal output is the appropriate sum of the number of trades. That
is,
NXij = mi(1   mi)(1   )2a(0;0;i) + (   ji)jia(j;j;i) +
(   ji)(1   mi)(1   )a(j;0;i) + miji(1   )a(0;j;i): (5.2)
Notice that the right-hand side of (5.2) is the right-hand side of (5.1) with y(s;s0;i) replaced by
a(s;s0;i): The pair (Yij;Pij) occurs with probability piij; where, as above, pi denotes the stationary
probability that the state is i: Therefore, the pair (Yij;Pij) and the exogenous probability piij for
each (i;j) completely describe the Markov process for total output and the price level. For each
example, we report the pair (Yij;Pij) implied by (5.1) and (5.2) for the optimal mechanism.
The rst two examples share all but one feature. Both have S = 2 and the symmetric  given
in (4.11). We let u be the square-root function|mainly because it is a simple function that satises
our general assumptions. For that choice of u; y = 1
4: We also let N = 3; the minimum consistent
with no double-coincidence meetings. For both examples, the support for the money supply is
(m1;m2) = (4
9; 1
2). The quantity 1
2 is the amount of money that maximizes the probability of trade
meetings for an economy with a constant money supply. If m2 = 1
2; then m1 = 4
9 implies that we
are studying roughly 10% increases and decreases in the amount of money in these examples. We
choose  so that y1
max = y; which gives  = 27
32: That, in turn, implies that y2
max = 81
361 = :224:
The two examples dier regarding ": As noted above, for S = 2 and for a symmetric ; we expect
to have trade occur all the time if " in (4.11) is not too close to zero and we expect to have
no-trade occur when (i;j) = (1;2) if " is small enough. Example 1 has " = 0:1, which implies
that trade always occurs. Example 2 has " = :0025; which turns out to be small enough to get
no-trade in meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers when (i;j) = (1;2):8
For each "; we report results for three values of  :  = 1
9; the minimum consistent with (2.1);
 = 11
20; the magnitude which maximizes the probability of meetings between informed producers
and uninformed consumers; and  = 1; the benchmark.
Before we present the results for aggregates, we present for one case the meeting-specic outputs
from which the aggregates are deduced. When everyone is informed, there is only one kind of
meeting per date and the output in that meeting depends only on the current state. In example
1 when  = 1; y(1;1;i) = :2270 and y(2;2;i) = :2160: Because there is only one kind of meeting
per date, the price level is simply the inverse of meeting-specic output. Notice that even in the
low money supply state, output is less than y1
max = 1
4: This happens for two reasons: the money
supply may increase, which would reduce the probability of meeting someone without money, and
the producer may be given money without producing. In all our examples, the persistence in the
money supply process is sucient to imply that j > j+1: In addition, in all the examples, when
7We must use a price index because, in general, the price of output is dependent on the kind of meeting. The
price in a meeting is 1=y(s;s
0;i) for s and s
0 2 S. Therefore, for given past and current states, the price varies with
who in the meeting is informed. Therefore, an outside observer collecting such prices would have to use an index to
compute a price level.
8The section 4.3 sucient condition is satised for examples 1 and 2. The value of Z(y
k) (see lemma 8), which
is the same for each k by the symmetry of the example, never rises above :12. This is below the values of Z shown
in tables 3 and 4 below, the values for the optima. Because 1 > 2; the mechanism that sets a(0;2;1) = 0 (the
optimum when  = :0025) satises the producer truth-telling constraint. Also, the values of 1 and 2 imply that
u(2) > 1; so the consumer individual rationality constraints are not binding. Therefore, the value of Z we
report is a valid choice for Zmin in lemma 8.
17 = 1 the ordering for aggregate output is the same as that for meeting-specic output . This is
not a general result. It happens in part because our money supplies are near 1
2; where the function
m(1   m) is fairly at.
Table 2. Meeting specic outputs for example 1 with  = 1
9:
y(j;j;i) y(0;0;i) y(j;0;i);j > 0 y(0;j;i);j > 0
j = 1 j = 2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 1 i = 2
.22559 .21541 .22458 .21642 .22365 .21541 .21541
Table 2 contains meeting-specic outputs for example 1 for  = 1
9: The rst two columns contain
output in meetings between informed people. These dier from those in the benchmark because
 aects : The next two columns contain output in meetings between uninformed people. Here,
there is no dependence on the current state and the dependence on the previous state is weaker
than the dependence on the current state for meetings between informed people because the Markov
process gives rise to less two-period persistence than one-period persistence. The next two columns
contain output in meetings between informed consumers and uninformed producers. Here, output
does not depend on the current state because of the truth-telling requirement. Notice also that for
each i output is lower than when two uninformed people meet. This happens because uninformed
producers who meet informed people with money place more weight than 12 on the possibility
that the money supply has increased. (In fact, in this example, when the money supply decereases,
no informed person has money, so when an uninformed producer meets an informed consumer with
money, the producer is able to deduce that the current state is state 2 which implies the same
output level as for an informed producer.) The last column contains output in meetings between
uninformed consumers and informed producers. Here output depends on neither the current state
nor the previous state and is the same as in a meeting between informed people when the current
state is the high money supply state. The next two tables contain the example 1 and 2 results for
aggregates, with total output scaled up by 105.
Table 3. Example 1:  given by (4.11) with " = 1
10
 Z j Y1j Y2j P1j P2j 
1 1868.57 1868.57 4.405 4.405 .2691
1 .132033 2 1800.01 1800.01 4.630 4.630 .2560
Xii0 Xii
Xii -3.67% 3.81% 5.11% -4.86% -4.87%
1 1820.68 1792.335 4.521 4.592 .2654
11
20 .131924 2 1823.49 1792.350 4.570 4.649 .2545
Xii0 Xii
Xii 0.15% -0.0008% 1.09% -1.23% -4.13%
1 1840.25 1779.59 4.4725 4.6249 .2674
1
9 .131988 2 1868.91 1801.75 4.4589 4.6251 .2553
Xii0 Xii
Xii 1.56% -1.23% -0.30% -0.004% -4.52%
18Table 4. Example 2:  given by (4.11) with " = 1
400
 Z j Y1j Y2j P1j P2j 
1 2051.36 2051.36 4.012 4.012 .29540
1 .132325 2 1869.43 1869.43 4.458 4.458 .26587
Xii0 Xii
Xii -8.87% 9.73% 11.10% -9.99% -9.99%
1 2050.03 1906.27 4.015 4.318 .29524
11
20 .132291 2 1598.42 1869.40 4.171 4.458 .26584
Xii0 Xii
Xii -22.03% 1.97% 3.89% -3.14% -9.96%
1 2050.71 1846.67 4.013 4.45691 .29538
1
9 .132324 2 2055.43 1869.75 4.015 4.45693 .26586
Xii0 Xii
Xii 0.23% -1.23% 0.03% -0.0003% -9.99%
In tables 3 and 4, the rows labeled
Xii0 Xii
Xii contain percentage changes of switching states
relative to not switching states, except when they pertain to . For ; the entry is 2 1
1 :
In addition to impact eects, the outcomes associated with any pattern of realizations for the
money supply can be identied. For example, if " = 0:1 and  = 11
20 and if the sequence of
money realizations starting at date t   1 is (m1;m1;m2;m2;m1), then the sequence for the price
level starting at date t is (4:521;4:570;4:649;4:592): Also, all the meeting-specic outputs can be
computed from the reported  using the applicable conditional expectations as given in proposition
1.
As we suggested in the introduction, impact eects on aggregate output depend on whether trade
is ever shut down and on the probability of meetings between informed producers and uninformed
consumers. For " = 0:1 when there is always-trade, there are positive impact eects on output
relative to the benchmark. That is Y12=Y11 is larger when  < 1 than when  = 1: This happens
because when the money supply increases, meeting-specic output is higher in meetings between
informed consumers and uninformed producers than it is between informed people when  = 1:
For " = 0:0025; there is no-trade when informed producers meet uninformed consumers and the
money supply has increased. When  = 11
20; which maximizes the probability of meetings between
informed producers and uninformed consumers, an increase in the amount of money, through the
shutting down of trade between informed producers and uninformed consumers, produces a large
decline in output relative to what happens in the benchmark. When  = 1
9; that does not happen
because most informed people have money when the amount of money increases. In this case, there
is a large positive impact eect on output relative to the benchmark.
The price in each kind of meeting is simply the inverse of output in the meeting. The only
meeting-specic price that changes when the money supply changes is that in meetings between
the informed (see table 2, for example). That eect tends to make the (aggregate) price level
change in the same direction as the money supply. But, because it is the only price that changes,
the impact eects on the price level tend to be weaker the smaller is : Moreover, that eect can
even be oset by compositional eects, which happens in example 1 when  = 1
9:; there, P12 < P11:
When  = 1
9 and the money supply increases, only 1
18 of the informed are without money. Hence,
there are very few trade-meetings among the informed. The increase in the amount of money
produces fewer meetings between informed producers and uninformed consumers (because there
are few informed people without money) and more meetings between informed consumers and
uninformed producers. Under always-trade, the meeting-specic price is higher when producers are
relatively informed than when consumers are relatively informed (see table 2). Hence, the altered
composition tends to lower the price index.
As might be expected, the highest level of ex ante welfare, Z; is achieved when everyone is
19informed. However, ex ante welfare is not monotone in : The prevalence of meetings between
informed producers and uninformed consumers, which depends on  in a non-monotone way, is
one source of the non-monotonicity of welfare. In example 1, when there is always-trade, output
is minimal in such meetings because it satises the producer's individual rationality constraint for
the smaller component of  no matter what is the current state. In example 2, this low output is
partly overcome, but only at the cost of shutting down trade when the money supply increases.
Example 3 is designed to have non-monotone impact eects of increases in the amount of
money on output. The example has S = 3 and combines features of examples 1 and 2 so that large
increases in the amount of money produce a shutting down of trade, but small increases do not.
We continue to let u be the square-root function, and let N = 3: The support for the money supply
is (m1;m2;m3) = ( 5
12; 4
9; 1
2)  (:4167;:4444;:5000); while  = 36
43 so that, again, y1
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with ("1;"2) = (:0500;:0025): Even though the range for the money supply is larger for this example,
it remains true that the hypothesis of lemma 8 holds.9 For this example, we computed results only
for  = 1 and  = 11
20:
Table 5. Example 3:  in (5.3) with ("1;"2) = ( 1
20; 1
400)
 Z j Y1j Y2j Y3j P1j P2j P3j 
1 1953 1953 1953 4.148 4.148 4.148 .2879
1 .1259 2 1858 1858 1858 4.430 4.430 4.430 .2696
3 1751 1751 1751 4.759 4.759 4.759 .2510
1 1874 1797 1755 4.324 4.508 4.617 .2810
11
20 .1257 2 1870 1793 1750 4.401 4.589 4.702 .2638
3 1542 1791 1743 4.441 4.654 4.781 .2495
As in the rst two examples, in the benchmark total output is decreasing in the amount of
money. When  = 11
20; small increases in the amount of money are expansionary relative to the
benchmark. That is, Y12=Y11 and Y23=Y22 are each larger than their values for the benchmark.
However, as promised, a large increase is contractionary relative to the benchmark. That is,
Y13=Y11 is smaller than its value in the benchmark. As in the other examples, the price level is less
responsive to changes in the amount of money than it is in the benchmark. Again, welfare is lower
with uninformed people than when everyone is informed.
6. Randomization
The mechanisms studied above are deterministic. More general mechanisms would permit random-
ization. There are three conceivable kinds of randomization. First, there could be randomization
over outcomes, some of which include positive production and no transfer of money from the con-
sumer to the producer. Such randomization would not satisfy our individual-rationality constraints,
9This is shown by comparing the value of Z(y
k) = :1104 (which is the same for each k; by the symmetry of the
example) with the value of Z in the table; note that 1 > 2 > 3; so that the mechanism that sets a(0;3;1) = 0
satises producer truth-telling. Also, consumer individual rationality constraints hold because u(3) > 1.
Therefore, the value of Z is a valid choice for Zmin.
20because the producer would not accept an outcome that calls for production and no transfer of
money.10 Second, there could be randomization over outcomes in which each of several dierent
amounts of production exchanges for a unit of money. While such randomization could be incentive
feasible, we doubt that it could be optimal. We suspect that shifting probability toward the highest
output that occurs with positive probability would be incentive feasible and would raise ex ante
welfare. Third, there could be randomization over trade|no-trade sets. This kind of randomiza-
tion is also incentive feasible and, as we show by example, can be optimal. We rst present the
example and then comment more generally on such randomization.
The reasoning behind the example is as follows. Consider the S = 2 symmetric  given by (4.11).
By proposition 3 and our examples, there is a critical value of " at which the optimum switches
from Sp(1) = f1g, trade is shut down when the money supply increases, to Sp(1) = f1;2g; always-
trade. At that point, the mechanism varies discontinuously, but Z does not. Randomization over
whether trade occurs could smooth the mechanism and, as we now explain, is likely to raise Z: For
q 2 [0;1], let a(0;2;1) = 1 with probability q, y(0;2;1) = 2; and y(0;1;1) = (1 q)1 +q2:
For q = 0; this corresponds to Sp(1) = f1g; while for q = 1; it corresponds to Sp(1) = f1;2g: Also,
if 1  2; then it satises truth-telling for the informed producer. The part of Z that depends
directly on q is proportional to
(1   ")11z[(1   q)1 + q2] + "21qz(2): (6.1)
Holding  xed, this term is strictly concave in q: Therefore, if this term has the same value at
q = 0 and at q = 1|which, by proposition 2, happens at the critical value of "|then it takes
higher values at interior values of q: Although suggestive, this conclusion is not decisive because it
ignores the dependence of  on q: Therefore, we produce an example which takes such dependence
into account.
The example is the same as the S = 2 examples in section 5, except that  = 1
2 and " = 1
200: This
" is very near the critical one at which the optimum switches from Sp(1) = f1g to Sp(1) = f1;2g:
Letting Z(q) denote ex ante welfare as a function of q; we nd Z(1) = :1322575; Z(0) = :1322572;
and Z(1
2) = :1322645: Therefore, always-trade, q = 1; is slightly better than shutting down trade,
q = 0; but mixing with q = 1
2 is still better. Thus randomization is optimal in this example.
Despite this nding, we suspect that randomization would not drastically change the kind
of necessary conditions we found and, therefore, the kind of possibilities for the optimum that
we displayed in section 5. Although we have not carried out a complete analysis, our suspicion
is based on the following conjectures. Allowing randomization changes the individual-rationality
constraints and the expression for ex ante welfare in relatively simple ways. Therefore, for the
relaxed welfare problem in which we drop the producer's truth-telling constraint, we suspect that
there are necessary conditions for an optimum that are very much like the conclusions in proposition
1 and that will not imply randomization except near critical values for the deterministic problem.
If the mechanism that produces the highest value of ex ante welfare for that relaxed problem turns
out to satisfy truth-telling for the informed producer, then that mechanism is the optimum. Based
on our section 4 discussion for S = 2, we suspect that the solution to the relaxed problem is likely
to satisfy producer truth-telling for many specications in the region of the parameter space we
study.
10See [2] for the study of such randomization in a similar model without uncertainty, but in which it is assumed
that people can commit to the outcome of randomization.
217. Take-it-or-leave-it oers by consumers
Matching models of the sort we are studying have often been analyzed using a bargaining rule.
Among the most commonly used, because it is simple, is take-it-or-leave-it oers by consumers:
the consumers says \I will give you my unit of money if and only if you produce the amount x."
Our optimum resembles an equilibrium under such bargaining because, according to proposition
1, producers are being pushed to where they are on the margin between accepting and rejecting
trade. In fact, any equilibrium under deterministic take-it-or-leave-it oers by consumers is one
of the candidates for an optimum, one of the mechanisms that satisfy proposition 1. However,
the optimum is not always such an equilibrium. In particular, at an optimum, an uninformed
consumer facing an informed producer and making a take-it-or-leave-it oer leans toward an x that
shuts down trade in more states than the optimum dictates.
This tendency is easy to see if, for the moment, we ignore the dependence of  on the Sp(i)
sets. Then, if j > j+1, the ex ante welfare gain from shutting down trade in one additional







ijji  Bp(r;i): (7.1)
The dierence here represents a trade-o between the output r 1 with some probability and
the lower output r with a higher probability. In contrast, the net gain to the consumer from
demanding the output r 1 rather than the smaller output r is proportional to
r 1 X
j=1
ijji[u(r 1)   j]  
r X
j=1
ijji[u(r)   j] =




Thus, the consumer sees an additional benet to shutting down trade; by making the more de-
manding oer, the consumer avoids giving up money in state r when it has a value that would
command a higher output in state r   1. That term does not aect ex ante welfare, because the
distribution of money at the start of the next period is not aected by whether trade occurs in
state r:
Of course, the above comparison is not the correct one because it ignores the dependence of 
on the Sp(i) sets. Nevertheless, the comparison suggests that if the optimum has always-trade by
a small margin, then that may not be an equilibrium under take-it-or-leave-it oers by consumers.
That happens for the example presented in the discussion of randomization. There the optimum has
always-trade and implies (1;2) = (:2855514;:265532): If the uninformed consumer who meets
an informed producer demands 1 in exchange for surrendering money, then the consumer's
expected gain is 199
200[(1)
1
2  1]; where, recall,  = 27
32: If, instead, the consumer demands 2











2002; which is positive.
Therefore, in this case, the always-trade optimum is not an equilibrium under take-it-or-leave-it
oers by consumers.
As might be suspected, an equilibrium under take-it-or-leave-it oers by consumers may not
exist unless there is randomization when the consumer is indierent between two oers. In the above
22example, the Sp(1) = f1g mechanism that satises proposition 1 is an equilibrium under take-it-or-







when evaluated at the  implied by that mechanism|namely, (1;2) = (:294211;:265728):
8. Concluding Remarks
We have worked with what might be regarded as a minimally interesting model and a minimally
interesting class of mechanisms. In addition to considering randomization and other regions of
the parameter space, it would be desirable to check the robustness of our ndings to some of our
more extreme assumptions. We have made substantial use of the indivisibility of money and the
unit upper bound. Obviously, truth-telling constraints would not have such simple implications
if the money trades could be other than surrendering 0 or 1 unit. Settings with richer individual
holdings of money would be much harder to study because in them the distribution of money
holdings depends on the mechanism. Another extension to consider is an information structure in
which the identity of the informed is not common knowledge. Such a change gives rise to additional
truth-telling constraints and to two-sided asymmetric information in meetings. A third extension
would consider lengthening the lag with which there is a public announcement of the state. Such
a version would permit the study of whether it is optimal to have people always leave meetings
symmetrically informed.
In an important sense, though, the simplicity of our model is a virtue. Our background envi-
ronment was designed by others to depict in a simple way absence-of-double-coincidence problems
that are so severe that the use of money is the only way to depart from autarky. We have put
into that environment monetary uncertainty and asymmetric information about realizations in a
way that does not tie a person's information status to the person's money holdings. Then, despite
assuming that money holdings are either 0 or 1 unit, that public revelation of realizations occurs
after one period, that there is common knowledge about who is informed and despite assuming
that the society nds the best way of conducting trade in the presence of the uncertainty and
the implied asymmetric information, we have found that the resulting pattern of output and price
level responses is very complicated. Relative to the benchmark of everyone informed, there can
be positive or negative impact eects on output and the price level tends to be sticky. (Thus, if
Hume is interpreted as asserting that asymmetric information about monetary realizations can be
responsible for complicated patterns relative to complete information, then the model supports his
view.) Because those complicated patterns are implied by very extreme and simple assumptions, we
conclude that such patterns should no longer be regarded as mysteries. In particular, we conjecture
that further complicating the model in the directions mentioned above will further complicate the
implied patterns of aggregate output and the price level.
Finally, we are aware, of course, that models of output responses based on incomplete infor-
mation are widely viewed as less applicable to modern economies than to the economy that Hume
was describing. Despite that, there are two reasons for not dismissing such models. First, no
model of output responses to money-supply shocks seems free from dependence on technological
developments that inuence the spread of information. For example, it is hard to imagine that
price-setting lags, no matter what accounts for them, stay xed in response to developments like
bar-coding that make it much easier to change and disseminate information about prices. Indeed,
after all the attempts made by economists to spell out in a coherent way the kinds of claims that
Hume made in the passage quoted in the introduction, the conclusion that seems warranted is
that output responses to money-supply changes seem dependent on messy details that cannot be
expected to remain unchanged over long periods of time. Second, although the model works with
23a single aggregate-demand shock, the money supply, its logic seems applicable to any kind of ag-
gregate demand shock. Therefore, the availability of up-to-date information about the `actions' of
some central banks does not imply that the features at work in the model play no role in modern
economies. For that to be the case, it would have to be argued that there is complete information
about all signicant aggregate demand realizations.
9. Appendix
This section contains proofs of the lemmas and propositions.
Lemma 1. If (2.1) holds, then ji and    ji are non-negative.
Proof. We have (1 mi)  (1 mS)  mS  mS m1  mj mi; where the second inequality
follows from the rst part of (2.1) and the third from the lower bound condition on  in (2.1). This
implies that ji  0: Also, (1   )mi  (1   )mS = mS   mS  mS   (mS   m1)  mj; where
the second inequality follows from the lower bound condition on : in (2.1). This implies that
mj  (1   )mi; and, hence, that    ji; is non-negative.
Lemma 2. For any mechanism, Z satises (3.16).
Proof. From the denition of ij (see (3.5)),
mj   mi =

 miij j < i
(1   mi)ij otherwise. (9.1)



































piij[(   ji)v1(1;j;i) + jiv0(1;j;i)]: (9.3)












































piijji[(   ji)G0(1;1;j;i) + (1   )miG0(0;1;j;i)]: (9.4)




















piij (   ji)[jiz(y(j;j;i)) + (1   )(1   mi)z(y(j;0;i))]: (9.5)





piij[mjV1(j) + (1   mj)V0(j)] =
S X
j=1






pj[mjV1(j) + (1   mj)V0(j)] = Z: (9.6)
When this is substituted into (9.5), we get (3.16), as required.





































ij(   ji)j; (9.8)
where   1
i (Sc(i))  0  1





0(0   )x = 0; (9.9)
as required.
Lemma 4. Let h(x;y;a) be given by (4.4)-(4.6). Then (i) (y;a) is a xed point of h(;y;a) and
vice versa; (ii) h(;y;a) satises Blackwell's sucient conditions for contraction; (iii) if x  (y;a)
and h(x;y0;a0)  (y;a); then (y0;a0)  (y;a); and (iv) if y0  y; then (y0;a)  (y;a):




ij[(1   )i(0;j) + (   ij)i(1;j)]; (9.10)
where i(;j)  v1(;j;i)   v1(;j;i): Also, from (3.3), we have
Ni(;j) = Nj + jiG1(;1;j;i) + (1   )(1   mi)G1(;0;j;i)
 (   ji)G0(1;;j;i)   (1   )miG0(0;;j;i): (9.11)
Then, if we substitute from (9.11) into (9.10) and use the denition of Gk(c;p;j;i); it follows that
(y;a) satises the matrix equation,
(y;a) = b(y) + C(a)(y;a): (9.12)
By the denition of h(;y;a); it follows that (y;a) is a xed points of h. Therefore, (i) is true.
As regards (ii), it follows from (4.5) that cij(a)=ij 2 (1   ij)[1   N 1;1]; where the lower
endpoint is attained when money is always transferred and the upper endpoint when money is
never transferred. Because (2.1) implies that ij < 1; it follows that cij=ij 2 (0;1]: That implies
that h(;y;a) is monotone increasing and satises discounting, Blackwell's sucient conditions for
contraction.
Claim (iii) is an obvious consequence of contraction. That is, if h(n)((y;a);y0;a0)  (y;a);
then h(n+1)((y;a);y0;a0) = h[h(n)((y;a);y0;a0);y0;a0]  h((y;a);y0;a0)  (y;a); where h(n)(x;y0;a0)
is the n-th iterate of h applied to x; where the rst inequality follows from monotonicity of h and the
second inequality is the hypothesis, which serves as the initial condition for the induction step. But
by the contraction property, limn!1 h(n)(x;y0;a0) = (y0;a0); which implies (y0;a0)  (y;a):
From (4.6), b(y) is increasing in y: That and claim (iii) imply claim (iv).
Lemma 5. If (y;a) satises producer individual-rationality constraints and has constant output
over trade states in meetings between informed and uninformed; then y(s;s0;i)   maxi i(y;a) 
y1
max:
26Proof. Let K = maxi i(y;a). Then y(s;s0;i)  a(s;s0;i)K; for all s;s0;i:
From equations 3.3 we have
Ni(0;j) = N j + jiz(y(0;j;i)) + (1   )(1   mi)z(y(0;0;i))
+(1   )[y(0;0;i)   a(0;0;i)j] + ji [y(0;j;i)   a(0;j;i)j]
+ (   ji)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)j]
Ni(1;j) = N j + jiz(y(j;j;i)) + (1   )(1   mi)z(y(j;0;i))
+[y(j;j;i)   a(j;j;i)j] + (1   )mi [y(0;j;i)   a(0;j;i)j]
+(1   )(1   mi)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)j] (9.13)
where j = j(y;a):
Let  = maxs;s0;i z(y(s;s0;i)): Then, using the denition of  and the producer's individual-
rationality constraints,
Ni(0;j)  N j + (1   mj) + (1   )[y(0;0;i)   a(0;0;i)j]
+ (   ji)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)j]
Ni(1;j)  N j + (1   mj)
+(1   )(1   mi)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)j] (9.14)
These inequalities can be rewritten as
Ni(0;j)  (1   mj) + (1   )y(0;0;i) + (   ji)y(j;0;i)
+[N   (1   )a(0;0;i)   (   ji)a(j;0;i)]j
Ni(1;j)  (1   mj) + (1   )(1   mi)y(j;0;i)
+[N   (1   )(1   mi)a(j;0;i)] j (9.15)
Then since the coecients of j are positive,
Ni(0;j)  (1   mj) + (1   )y(0;0;i) + (   ji)y(j;0;i)
+[N   (1   )a(0;0;i)   (   ji)a(j;0;i)]K
= N K + (1   mj) + (1   )[y(0;0;i)   a(0;0;i)K]
+ (   ji)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)K]
Ni(1;j)  (1   mj) + (1   )(1   mi)y(j;0;i)
+[N   (1   )(1   mi)a(j;0;i)] K
= N K + (1   mj)
+(1   )(1   mi)[y(j;0;i)   a(j;0;i)K] (9.16)
But then since y(0;0;i)  a(0;0;i)K; and y(j;0;i)  a(j;0;i)K;
Ni(0;j)  N K + (1   mj)
Ni(1;j)  N K + (1   mj) (9.17)
















Then because this holds for all i; and
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By the denition of y1










Now because the function z is increasing on the interval [0;y] and because y(s;s0;i)  K; it





This, in turn, implies K  y1
max:
Proposition 1. If (y;a) is optimal and satises u( mins s(y;a))  y1
max; then (i) Sc(i)  S+
and (y;a) satises (4.7)-(4.10); (ii) for each i; Sp(i) is not empty; and (iii) if j(y;a) = k(y;a);
then for each i either j;k 2 Sp(i) or j;k 2 S+   Sp(i):
Proof. Suppose that (y;a) is optimal, but does not satisfy (i). Then we consider (y0;a0) given by
(4.7)-(4.10), but with (y;a) inserted on the right-hand sides of (4.7)-(4.10) and with Sc(i) replaced
by S+.
Our rst task is to show that y0  y: For all but, Y c(i)0; this follows immediately from the
fact that each component of y satises the relevant producer individual rationality constraint. For













ij(   ji)j = Y c(i)0; (9.23)
where the rst inequality is by incentive feasibility of y and where the second is lemma 3.
We next show that (y0;a0)  (y;a): By the third part of lemma 4, it is enough to show
that hi((y;a);y0;a0)  i(y;a) = hi((y;a);y;a); where hi is the i-th component of the mapping
dened in (4.4). Because hi is a sum of terms, we can deal one-at-a-time with the replacements
given by (4.7)-(4.10). Because y0  y and h(x;y;a) is increasing in y; we need only concern ourselves
28with situations in which the replacement of (y;a) by (y0;a0) involves replacing a no-trade outcome
by a trade outcome.
An informed consumer meets an uninformed producer, (4.7).
Considering only the (4.7) substitution, (9.12 ) implies that
N
1   




ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i)0)   j] +
X
j2Sc(i)




ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i)0)   j] +
X
j2S+ Sc(i)




ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i))   j]  
X
j2Sc(i)
ij(   ij)[Y c(i)   j]
= (1   mi)
X
j2Sc(i)




ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i)0)   j]  
X
j2Sc(i)
ij(   ij)[Y c(i)   j]
where the second equality follows from the denition of Y c(i)0: Because (y;a) is incentive-feasible
and, in particular, satises the uninformed producer's individual-rationality constraint, we have P
j2Sc(i)
ij(   ij)[Y c(i)   j]  0: Therefore,
N
(1   )(1   mi)
[hi((y;a);y0;a0)   hi((y;a);y;a)] 
X
j2Sc(i)
ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i)0)   u(Y c(i))] +
X
j2S+ Sc(i)
ij(   ij)[u(Y c(i)0)   j] (9.24)
The rst term is nonnegative by (9.23). The second term is nonnegative because Y c(i)0   mins s
and u( mins s)  y1
max   maxs s by hypothesis and lemma 4.
An uninformed consumer meets an uninformed producer, (4.8).
Here, the replacement of no trade by trade given by (4.8) implies, according to (9.12), that
N[hi((y;a);y0;a0)   hi((y;a);y;a)] =
(1   )2(1   mi)
S X
j=1
ij[u(y(0;0;i)0)   j] + (1   )mi
S X
j=1
ij[y(0;0;i)0   j] =
(1   )2(1   mi)
S X
j=1
ij[u(y(0;0;i)0)   j]  0: (9.25)
The second equality follows from the denition of y(0;0;i)0 and the inequality is implied by
y(0;0;i)0   mins s and u( mins s)  y1
max   maxs s:
An informed consumer meets an informed producer, (4.9).
Here, the replacement of no trade by trade given by (4.9) implies, according to (9.12), that
N[hi((y;a);y0;a0)   hi((y;a);y;a)] =
X
j
ij(   ij)ji[u(j)   j]  0; (9.26)
29where the summation is over some set of current states.
We now have y0  y and (y0;a0)  (y;a): It follows that (y0;a0) satises all the pro-
ducer individual-rationality constraints. Moreover, by lemma 5, (y0;a0)  y1
max: Therefore,
u( mins s(y0;a0))  u( mins s(y;a))  y1
max   maxs s(y0;a0): This implies that (y0;a0)
satises all the consumer individual-rationality constraints. It also satises truth-telling for the
informed consumer because it has trade in every state when the consumer is informed. But (y0;a0)
may or may not satisfy truth-telling for informed producers. If it does, then we have a contradiction
because y1
max  y0  y and we have either increased output or replaced no-trade by trade, both of
which increase Z:
If not, because (y0;a0)  (y;a); then there is some previous state i and some current state
r such that a(0;r;i) = 0 and
r(y0;a0) > Y p(i)0  r(y;a) (9.27)
where the second inequality holds because (y;a) is incentive-feasible. That is, the informed producer
would like to get money in additional states when responding to the incentives implied by (y0;a0)
as opposed to those implied by (y;a): If so, then dene a new mechanism (y00;a00) that agrees
with (y0;a0) except that
a(0;r;i)00 = 1 and y(0;r;i)00 = Y p(i)0: (9.28)
for all pairs r;i satisfying (9.27). Note that this increases the number of states with trade when
the producer has private information. The replacement of no-trade by trade in state r implies,
according to (9.12), that
N
1   
[hi((y;a);y00;a00)   hi((y;a);y;a)] =
irri[u(Y p(i)0)   r(y;a)] + ir(   ir)mi[Y p(i)0   r(y;a)]  0: (9.29)
Therefore, by the third part of lemma 4, (y00;a00)  (y;a). Thus (by repeating the arguments
given above for (y0;a0)), the mechanism (y00;a00) satises all the constraints except possibly the
producer's truth-telling constraints. If the producer's truth-telling constraints are also satised
then (y00;a00) is incentive-feasible and has higher output and, therefore, higher welfare than (y;a);
contradicting the assumption that (y;a) is optimal. But, again, it may happen that (y00;a00) violates
the producer's truth-telling constraint. If so, then we amend (y00;a00) by adding states in which
trade occurs. Since the producer's truth-telling constraints are satised if Sp(i) = S+; and since
the number of states is nite, repetition of these steps must lead to a mechanism that satises the
producer's truth-telling constraints, with higher output and therefore higher welfare than (y;a); a
contradiction: Thus, condition (i) is necessary for an optimum.
Now suppose (y;a) is optimal, but Sp(i) is empty: Let k be such that k(y;a) = maxj j(y;a):
Then consider (y0;a0) that agrees with (y;a) except that a(0;k;i)0 = 1 and y(0;k;i)0 = k(y;a):
Then, as was done above, it can be shown that (y0;a0)  (y;a): It follows, as in the argument
above, that (y0;a0) gives higher welfare and satises all the constraints except perhaps the truth-
telling constraint for informed producers. However, if it fails to satisfy that constraint, then there
are two possibilities. One is that (9.27) might hold with respect to a previous state i0 6= i and,
therefore, such that Sp(i0)0 = Sp(i0): In that case we can apply the argument above which leads to
a contradiction. The other is that
r(y0;a0) > y(0;k;i)0 = k(y;a)  r(y;a) (9.30)
30where the last inequality holds because k(y;a) = maxj j(y;a): But this, too, is a version of
(9.27). Hence, again, we can dene a new mechanism (y00;a00) that agrees with (y0;a0) except that
a(0;r;i)00 = 1 and y(0;r;i)00 = k(y;a): (9.31)
for all states r satisfying (9.30). Thus, in this case also, we can apply the argument above which
leads to a contradiction.
Finally, suppose (y;a) is optimal but does not satisfy (iii). Then the optimum is such that
Sp(i) for some i partitions states in such a way that there are two current states, say j and k
with j = k and j 2 Sp(i) and k = 2 Sp(i). By truth-telling, it follows that j = minl2Sp(i) l:
Therefore, by necessary condition (i), (y;a) has Y p(i) = j: Then amend (y;a) by making the
omitted state a trade state without changing output. The rest of the argument is exactly like the
argument for necessary condition (i), and, therefore, produces a contradiction.
Lemma 6. Given Sp(i) for each i 2 S+; there exists a unique monetary mechanism that satises
(4.7)-(4.10).
Proof. We will use the following result (see [7]):
Suppose f = (f1;f2;:::;fn) is a function from Rn to Rn such that
(i) f is increasing
(ii) for each i;fi is a strictly concave function from Rn to R
(iii) f(0)  0
(iv) there is a positive vector xa such that f(xa) > xa
(v) there is a vector xb > xa such that f(xb) < xb:
Then there exists a unique positive vector x such that f(x) = x. Moreover, x 2 (xa;xb).
The proof proceeds by dening a mapping that satises conditions (i)-(v) and each of whose
xed points is a monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10). Let f from RS to RS be dened
as follows. For  2 RS let y = g() be the mapping dened by the equations




ijj for all i 2 S+; (9.33)
y(0;j;i) = a(0;j;i) min
k2Sp(i)







ik(   ki)k for all (i;j) 2 S+  S+. (9.35)
Then dene f()  b(g()) + C(a), where the vector b and the matrix C are as dened in
(9.12). It follows that if  is a xed point of f, then g() and the associated money transfers is a
mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) and vice versa. Therefore, for existence and uniqueness, the
claims in the lemma, it is enough to show that f() satises conditions (i)-(v).
31The mapping g is increasing and b is also increasing. Therefore, f is increasing. Because the
min function is concave, it follows that g is concave. And because b is concave in y, b(g()) is the







ij(   ij)jiu(y(j;j;i)) + 	();
where 	 is a nonnegative concave function, ij(   ij)ji is positive, and y(j;j;i) =
j
 : Because
u is strictly concave, this implies that fi is strictly concave.
Let a be the constant vector with a
j = "












ii2(1   mi): (9.36)
Because u0(0) = 1; the ratio
u(")












Thus a satises assumption (iv) of the xed point theorem.
Let b be the constant vector with b
j =
y
 ;j 2 S+: (Recall that u0(y) = 1:) Then fi(b) <
y
 by essentially the argument in the proof of lemma 5. Therefore, b satises assumption (v) of
the xed point theorem.
Finally, because the mapping f satises condition (iii) with equality, f has a unique positive
xed point ^ .
Lemma 7. Let Sp(i) for i 2 S+ be given. Let P = f : ii   > 0 for all ig: Then the unique
monetary mechanism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) is continuous in  for  2 P.
Proof. Let () be the unique positive xed point of f(;), where, for a given  2 P; f is
the mapping dened in the proof of lemma 6. That is, f(;)  b(g()) + C(a); where g is
dened by (9.32)-(9.35). We now restrict the domain of f to  2 [a;b]; where b is the bound
given in lemma 6 and where a is given by (9.38), but with ii in (9.37) replaced by : So dened,
the interval [a;b] does not depend on . For a given ; f is continuous in ; because it is
a composite of two functions. each of which is continuous in the components of : And with 
limited to the compact domain [a;b]; it follows that f is uniformly continuous in : That is, for
any " > 0, there exists a 1 > 0 such that if jj1   2jj < 1, then jjf(;1)   f(;2)jj < "
3 for
all :
Let n be a sequence converging to : Because the sequence (n) lies in a compact set,
it has a convergent subsequence (k). Let ^  be the limit of this subsequence. Then there
exists a 2 > 0 such that jjk   jj < 2 implies jjf((k);k)   ^ jj < "
3: Also, because f is
concave in , and, therefore, continuous in ; there exists a 3 > 0 such that jjk   jj < 3
implies jjf((k);)   f(^ ;)jj < "
3: And by uniform continuity in , jjk   jj < 1 implies
jjf((k);k)   f((k);)jj < "
3: Thus, if k is such that jjk   jj < min(1;2;3); then
jjf(^ ;)   ^ jj  jjf(^ ;)   f((k);)jj+
32jjf((k);)   f((k);k)jj + jjf((k);k)   ^ jj < ": (9.39)
Because this holds for any " > 0, f(^ ;) = ^ : And because f(^ ;) has a unique positive xed
point, it follows that ^  = (): Finally, if that original sequence (n) does not converge
to (); then it must have a subsequence that is bounded away from (). But that subse-
quence must in turn have a convergent subsequence. By the argument just given, the limit of that
subsequence can only be (): Thus, () is continuous:
Proposition 2. If the optimum satises u( mins s)  y1
max; then the maximized objective is
continuous in  for  such that ij is positive and ii is bounded away from 0.
Proof. For a given transition matrix , let 
() be the set of mechanisms identied in Lemma
6. Also, let 
() be the subset of 
() that is incentive-feasible. Because the always-trade
mechanism (Sp(i)  S+) is incentive-feasible and is in 
(), 
() is not empty.
Let n ! 0; and let Z
n be the optimal welfare for  = n; with Z
n = (y(n);a(n)), where
the function  is dened by equation 3.16 ; also let Z









0 + " for all j, with Z
nj = (y(nj);a(nj)): Because the set of possible a0s is nite
(there is a nite number of possible specications of the set Sp(i) for each i 2 S+), there must be at
least one a that occurs innitely often in this subsequence. Denote such an a by ^ a . Then we have,
(^ y(nj);^ a) > Z
0 + " for all j, where ^ y(nj) denotes the unique lemma 6 mechanism for a = ^ a:
Then, by lemma 7, (^ y(0);^ a) > Z
0. Therefore, the optimality of Z
0 implies (^ y(0);^ a) = 2 
(0):
But since (^ y(nj);^ a) 2 
(nj); we have r(^ y(nj);^ a)  s(^ y(nj);^ a) for all i;r;s such that
r = 2 ^ Sp(i) and s 2 ^ Sp(i); where ^ Sp(i) is the set Sp(i) that corresponds to ^ a. Because, again by
Lemma 7, these inequalities are preserved in the limit as nj ! 0; we have (^ y(0);^ a) 2 
(0);
a contradiction. Therefore, limsupn!1 Z
n  Z
0:
Let a = ~ a be optimal at  = 0: By part (iii) of Proposition 1 we know that, for all i 2 S+,
r = 2 ~ Sp(i) and s 2 ~ Sp(i) implies r(~ y(0);~ a) < s(~ y(0);~ a);:where ~ y() denotes the unique lemma
6 mechanism for a = ~ a: Lemma 7 then implies that (~ y(n);~ a) 2 
(n) for n suciently large.
Thus Z
n  (~ y(n);~ a), which implies liminfn!1 Z
n  Z
0:
It follows that limn!1 Z
n = Z
0:
Proposition 3. Let fkg ! I (the identity matrix) and be such that the corresponding sequence
of stationary probability vectors fpkg converges to a strictly positive vector. Assume that the
optimum for any  in the neighborhood of  = I satises u( mins s)  y1
max: There exists
K such that if k > K; then the optimum for k has no trade between informed producers and
uninformed consumers whenever the current state, j; exceeds the previous state, i.
Proof. Let fkg ! I be given and let fpkg ! p0: For  = I; dene the function, Z(I), to be Z
with p = p0:
The maximum of Z(I) over incentive-feasible (y;a) is y(ci;pi;;i) = yi
max: (When  = I; the
maximum is obtained state by state and for each state, the result is given in [3]. Denote that
maximum Z(I):
Now let Sp(i)0 = f1;2;:::;ig for each i: Also, let yk and k denote the unique monetary mech-
anism that satises (4.7)-(4.10) of proposition 1 when Sp(i) = Sp(i)0 and  = k: Finally, let y1




veried by inserting these expressions into (4.7)-(4.10 ) and (9.12) and noticing that they hold.)
Then, by lemma 7, limk!1 yk(ci;pi;;i) = yi
max and limk!1 k
i = yi
max=: That, in turn, implies
that if k is suciently large, then y0
k is incentive feasible. (This follows because the limit result
33implies that if k is large, then k
i > k
i+1: Now let Z() denote the maximized objective. It
follows that for any " > 0; there exists K such that k > K implies Z(k) > Z(I)   ": We now
show that if k is close enough to I, then a mechanism which has trade when the current state j
and previous state i satisfy j > i gives a value of the objective that is less than Z(I)   "; and,
therefore, cannot be optimal.





This follows by taking the limit of i(y;a) as given by (9.12) and noting two things: only terms of
the form limy(ci;pi;i) and lim[a(ci;pi;i)i] appear and the individual-rationality constraints
imply limy(ci;pi;i)  lim[a(ci;pi;i)i]: Now suppose by contradiction that the no-trade claim
is false. Then there exists a subsequence of the given sequence fkg; call it fng; such that
fng ! I and for each n the optimum has trade in some current state j; where j > i; the previous
state. Let Z00(n) denote the implied value of Z: The producer truth-telling constraint and (9.40)
imply that for suciently large n; either a(0;i;i)n = 0 or y(0;i;i)n  y
j
max + "0; where j > i and
where "0 > 0 but is otherwise arbitrary. (Recall that y
j
max < yi
max if j > i and that yi
max depends
on mi, but not on :) But (9.40) also implies that for suciently large n; y(ci;pi;i)n  yi
max +"i;
where, again, "i > 0 but is otherwise arbitrary. Because a component of y appears with a non-
vanishing coecient in limn!1 Z(n) if and only if it has the form y(ci;pi;i); it follows that
limsupfZ00(k)g < Z(I); a contradiction:
Lemma 8. Let Z(yk) be ex ante welfare implied by yk as given by (4.12). Let Zmin be the ex ante
welfare implied by some incentive-feasible mechanism. If there exists Zmin such that Z(yk)  Zmin
for each k 2 S+; then any optimum satises u( mins s)  y1
max:
Proof. If the optimum violates u( mins s)  y1




max:) If so, then yk is strictly greater than any optimal y. For yk(j;0;i);
this follows from lemma 3. For yk(j;j;i) and yk(0;0;i); it follows directly from the respective
producer individual rationality constraints. Finally, for yk(0;j;i); consider the second inequality in
(3.11), which is the individual rationality constraint for informed producers. If j 2 Sp(i); then the
minimum is no greater than k
j: If j = 2 Sp(i); then y(0;j;i) = 0. In either case, we get y(0;j;i) 
yk(0;j;i): Therefore, Z(yk) is strictly greater than the optimum Z . But if Z(yk)  Zmin for each
k 2 S+; then we have a contradiction and the optimum cannot satisfy u( mins s) < y1
max:
Lemma 9. There exists " > 0 such that if mS   m1 < "; then the hypothesis of lemma 8 holds.
Proof. Let (yx;1) denote an always-trade mechanism with yx(s;s0;i)  x; a mechanism in which
trade occurs in every trade meeting and output is the same in every trade meeting. For such a
mechanism,
cij(a) = (1  
1
N
)ij(1   ij); (9.41)
and
Nbi(yx) = (1   )
X
j
ij[(1   mj)u(x) + mjx]+
X
j
ij(   ij)[(1   mj)u(x) + mjx] =
X
j
ij(1   ij)[(1   mj)u(x) + mjx]; (9.42)
34where the rst equality in (9.42) comes from using the denition of ji to combine, in turn, the
rst two lines and the last two lines of the expression for Nbi(y) (see (4.6)). If u(x)  x; which is
implied by x  y1
max, then
Nbi(yx)  [(1   mS)u(x) + mSx](i) (9.43)
where (i) 
P
j ij(1   ij): Now let L = mini i(yx;1): Then by (9.12), L satises
NL  N min
i
bi(yx) + (N   1)Lmin
i
(i): (9.44)
Therefore, by (9.43), L satises
NL  [(1   mS)u(x) + mSx] + (N   1)L (9.45)
where   mini (i): Suppose, then, that we take for x the positive solution to x = L and (9.45)





(Notice that this solution is less than yS
max because  < 1: In fact, it is yS
max for an economy with a
discount factor 0 =  < :) By construction, then, (yx;1) with x given by the positive solution
to (9.46) satises producer individual-rationality constraints. We next have to satisfy consumer
individual-rationality constraints.
Let K = maxi i(yx;1): Then by (9.12), K satises
NK  N max
i
bi(yx) + (N   1)K max
i
(i): (9.47)
Therefore, by the same reasoning that led to (9.43), K satises
NK  [(1   m1)u(x) + m1x] + (N   1)K; (9.48)
where we have taken unity to be an upper bound on (i): With x given by the positive solution to
(9.46), it follows that K  y1
max=: Therefore, it is sucient for satisfaction of consumer individual-
rationality constraints for the mechanism (yx;1) with x given by the positive solution to (9.46) that
u(x)  y1
max:
Because truth-telling is vacuous for the mechanism (yx;1), that mechanism is incentive-feasible
provided u(x)  y1
max; which is a condition that is easy to check. If it holds, then Z(yx) is a possible
magnitude for Zmin:
To complete the proof, we rst show that x ! y1
max as mS  m1 ! 0: From (3.5) it follows that
ij ! 0 as mS m1 ! 0: Therefore, (i) ! 1 as mS m1 ! 0: It follows that as mS m1 ! 0; ! 1
and, hence, by the denition of x that x ! y1
max: That is, as  ! 1 and mS ! m1 in (9.46), then
the unique positive solution to (9.46) approaches the unique positive solution to (4.1) for mi = m1:
Now, for x suciently close to y1
max; we have u(x)  y1
max: Finally, for x suciently close to y1
max;
it follows that the hypothesis of lemma 8 holds.
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